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Abstract
Intergroup conflict, whether manifest as the absence of community cohesion or as the
presence of antisocial behaviour, is an issue of international concern. In the UK, confronting
the reality or perceived threat of intergroup conflict is a core feature of community cohesion
and antisocial behaviour policies. To varying degrees, the frameworks underpinning these
policies see the absence or breakdown of community relations as a cause of social disharmony.
A key challenge for policy is therefore improvement of the quality of community relations. In
this paper, we consider how government has approached this challenge. We filter our analysis
through the lens of civility, which proposes that the peaceful coexistence of diverse social
groups rests on the existence and maintenance of intergroup empathy and mutual respect.
This proposal is supported by international research evidence on the outcomes of meaningful
interactions, where these are predicated on equal group status, leading to changes in group
and intergroup perceptions and behaviours (the contact hypothesis). We consider the extent to
which community cohesion and anti-social behaviour policies in the UK demonstrate a coherent
conception of the problem of community relations, the quality of community relations to which
these policies aspire and whether the strategies deployed to address community relations seek
to support civility through meaningful interaction. We find that the policy debates start from
different presumptions concerning the roots of social disharmony, and this is reflected in
the nature of the interventions which the community cohesion and antisocial behaviour policy
frameworks support. In particular, we find that the social interaction promoted through policies
in the UK is not necessarily aimed at achieving social harmony through meaningful interaction
based on recognition of equal group status. We also show that these policies are based on little
in the way of evidence and prior knowledge.
Introduction
Intergroup conflict, whether manifest as the absence of community cohesion
(CC) or as the presence of antisocial behaviour (ASB) is an issue of international
concern. Confronting the reality or perceived threat of intergroup conflict is a core
feature of both CC policy and ASB policy in the UK (from their inception to date)
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To varying degrees, these policy frameworks portray the absence or breakdown of
community relations as a cause of social disharmony, whether this takes the form
of a lack of CC or the undertaking of ASB. A key challenge for policy is therefore
improvement of the quality of community relations. In this paper, we consider
how government has approached this challenge. We filter our analysis through
the lens of civility, which proposes that the peaceful coexistence of diverse social
groups rests on the existence and maintenance of intergroup empathy and mutual
respect. This proposal is supported by international evidence on the outcomes
of meaningful interactions, where these are predicated on equal group status
(the contact hypothesis). The CC and ASB policy discourses are infused with
the rhetoric of civility. We utilise this framework, therefore, to investigate the
conception of civility embedded in these discourses and the instruments deployed
to achieve its realisation.
Joint examination of the UK CC and ASB policy frameworks is justified
on four main grounds. First, both frameworks can be viewed as representative
of wider efforts by ‘New Labour’ administrations (1997–2010) to claim novel
political territory. Examining the emergence of the ASB framework, Mooney and
Young (2006: 399) comment that ‘the Labour Government discovered . . . a new
territory of concern and a beguiled public found a new crime wave replacing
the old’. In discussing the emergence of the CC framework, Robinson (2008:
17) claims that attention ‘was steered away from more intractable problems . . .
and directed towards virgin political territory that the government could colonise
with its own priorities and preoccupations’, and allies this shift to the rise of
a communitarian agenda (see Rose, 1999) wherein the community (or rather
community relations) becomes the vehicle through which social harmony can be
realised. As the Coalition Government (2010–) begins to articulate its own Big
Society agenda (Cabinet Office, 2010), the question emerges as to whether any
continuities and discontinuities can be discerned in terms of policy content and
overarching agenda.
Second, policy makers see CC and ASB as being connected: weak CC is
portrayed as contributing to ASB while ASB is understood to undermine CC. It
seems reasonable therefore to assume that CC and ASB policies would be based on
consistent principles in the way they approach the nurturing of social harmony.
In practice, however, the two policy positions are predicated on different views
of the causes of social disharmony and adopt distinct approaches to addressing
intergroup relations.
Third, both policy frameworks emerged within the context of New Labour
enthusiasm for evidence-based policy and practice (Cabinet Office, 1999). Thus, it
might be reasonable to expect that robust evidence has been deployed to support
the development of these policies. Our reading of the evidence base developed by
government does not support this interpretation. Rather, it is limited and narrow
in both instances. Moreover, the approaches to managing intergroup relations
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that are embedded in ASB policy are in some regards contrary to what prior
knowledge suggests as desirable.
Fourth, looking beyond the UK there is clear evidence that ASB and the
lack of CC, manifest in the quality of interactions in the neighbourhood, are
issues of concern. In Europe, for example, ASB is perceived to be a growing
problem in France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands, and is closely associated
with the ‘disrespectful behaviour’ of the young (ADT, 2006). Despite widespread
endeavours to promote economic and social integration, the persistence of ethnic
segregation in Europe has been well documented (Musterd and Van Kempen,
2009). However, there is also evidence from the Netherlands that ethnically
diverse neighbourhoods do not necessarily provoke social interaction between
native and minority populations. Vervoort (2012), for example, discerned that
high levels of ethnic diversity within a neighbourhood may create difficulties
for social interaction. Similarly, Gijsberts et al. (2011) found ethnic diversity to
have a negative effect on local contacts of all kinds, and more so for the natives
than for ethnic minorities. Beyond the recognition of ASB and the lack of CC
as international concerns, they are co-joined in policy narratives. For example,
though Wacquant (2008) traces distinct forces driving the marginalisation of
ethnic minorities and working class populations in the United States and Europe,
he makes the case that these groups and their behaviours are positioned in policy
discourse as responsible for the economic and social crises encountered in these
polities. In a similar vein, Flint (2009: 419) concludes that it is the ‘notion that
particular urban spaces . . . are becoming de-pacified which is a key driver of
contemporary concerns about declining social cohesion and civility in Western
European polities’.
We develop our argument as follows. The next section considers the
concept of civility and the idea of fostering group interaction as a way of
promoting social harmony. In the third, we consider the main dimensions
of CC policy in light of this discussion and the extent to which it reflects
research evidence more broadly. Subsequently, we consider the nature of the
relationship between CC and ASB, the evolution and structure of ASB policy
in the UK, the implicit view of intergroup relationships that underpins it and
the role that evidence has played in the policy setting process. In penultimate
section, we consider the following questions: To what extent do CC and ASB
policies recognise incivility as underpinning ASB and a lack of CC? Do these
policies demonstrate a coherent conception of civility? Is social interaction,
and of what type and quality, seen as the solution? In other words, what are
the qualities of community relations, of civility, to which these policies aspire?
And, what is the role of government in facilitating social interaction and civility
seen to be? More generally, we question the nature and quality of the evidence
base upon which these policies are based. In the final section, we offer some
conclusions.
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Civility, meaningful interaction and social harmony
Incivility in its different forms reflects poor quality relationships between
members of different groups that in turn serve to foment and sustain social
disharmony. Incivility may take the form of direct conflict. It can also be embodied
in conflicting expectations of social interaction or in the perceptions people
hold of other members of society. Thus, social disharmony can be understood
as manifest in our behaviours towards and perceptions of others. In contrast,
civility can be defined as ‘the codes of behaviour that allow us to share public
spaces’ (Griffith et al., 2011: 10). Such codes of behaviour, akin to Bannister
and Kearns’ (2009) conception of ‘proximate’ civility, Somerville’s (2009) ‘thin’
civility and Boyd’s (2006: 864) ‘formal’ civility, reduce civility ‘to the manners,
politeness, courtesies or other formalities of face-to-face interactions in everyday
life’. These interactions include verbal and non-verbal communication; the words
and gestures aimed at or used in the presence of others. This conception of
civility can be broadened, as often happens implicitly in discussions of incivility,
to embrace a wider spectrum of behaviours that impact upon others. Thus,
Bannister and Kearns (2009: 180) define ‘diffuse’ civility as holding ‘regard for
the effects of our actions and use of space on others with whom we share that
space without the condition of direct interaction or of co-presence at a point in
time’.1
It follows that civility is ‘negotiated and maintained through everyday social
encounters’ (Griffith et al., 2011: 12) and through our actions in public space in
the absence of others. However, while these interactions and actions operate as a
vehicle for social harmony, they can be characterised as superficial. In these terms,
civility enables diverse populations with contrasting identities and preferences,
and with no desire or capacity for more meaningful interaction, to peacefully
coexist.
These observations prompt consideration of the factors that underpin our
willingness, or in some senses capacity, to be civil to others. In part, as Bannister
and Kearns (2009) point out, civility is underpinned by an awareness of the other.
We require a cultural and social awareness of others to appreciate whether our
behaviours and expressions might be offensive to, or reinforce the stereotyping
of, others. We also need an awareness of the right to freedom of expression on
the part of cultural sub-groups. Such conditions imply the necessity of more
meaningful social interaction to stimulate awareness of the other. However, they
also depend on the disposition to be open to the presence and inclusion of others.
Whether others are viewed as a legitimate and welcome presence involves
acceptance and adjustment on the part of the majority as well as the minority
groups. This requires that we revisit our conception of civility. Our appreciation
of the legitimacy of others is based on a ‘substantive’ civility, which ‘denotes a
sense of standing or membership in the political community with its attendant
rights and responsibility’ (Boyd, 2006: 864). Under this interpretation, civility
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‘presupposes an active and affirmative moral relationship between persons. Being
civil is a way of generating moral respect and democratic equality . . . civility is a
moral obligation borne out of an appreciation of human equality’ (Boyd, 2006:
875).
In sum, civility is a code of superficial behaviours necessary to enable diverse
populations to coexist in harmony, yet the enactment of civility depends upon
an awareness of others informed by more meaningful social interaction. These
interactions need to be underpinned by recognition of the equality of all citizens.
In the absence of these conditions, incivility may take hold. Whether through
repeated disregard or institutionalised inequality of status, social groups foster
negative feelings toward one another that may develop into hostility and conflict.
Where substantive civility is lacking, the issue then becomes how best to
foster it. The idea that increased group interaction forms the basis for improving
relations is intuitively appealing and dates back to a number of pioneering social
psychology investigations of the 1940s (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2005). The clearest
initial exposition is given in Allport’s (1954) ‘contact hypothesis’, a contribution
enriched in the 1980s through the development of social identity theory (Wright
et al., 1996).
Allport maintained that intergroup prejudice can be lessened through
institutional support for intergroup cooperation based on equality of status
between the groups involved (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2005: 264),2 and there
is general consensus that the contact hypothesis is well supported (Pettigrew
and Tropp, 2005; Hewstone, 2009). The situational qualifying conditions
are important, as spatial proximity alone does not provoke interaction nor
does interaction necessarily engender civility (Flint, 2009). Hewstone and
Brown (1986) and Neilsen et al. (2006) have highlighted the requirement
of promoting ‘pleasant and cooperative’ interaction, rather than incidental
contact, if intergroup attitudes are to be challenged. More fundamentally, contact
involving a lack of perceived equality of status between groups is likely to aggravate
rather than ameliorate intergroup prejudice (Allport, 1954: 263; Brewer and
Gaertner, 2001: 453), which might reasonably be anticipated to lead to greater
incivility and social conflict. Thus, Bakker and Dekker (2012), examining the
consequences of a perceived ethnic hierarchy of social position, find that an
ethnic group’s level of social trust in their neighbours is lower where the share of
the next-lowest-placed ethnic group is higher in the neighbourhood, reflecting
socioeconomic threat. Trust is also lower where the share of the most distant
ethnic group is higher, reflecting cultural threat.
In this section, we have developed a conceptual model of civility in which
the notion of fostering social interaction can be seen as a way of promoting social
harmony. This model has been grounded in the particular conditions on which
this desirable outcome can be expected to materialise, which now enables us to
interrogate the CC and ASB policy frameworks.
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Community cohesion policy
The CC debate in the UK developed in response to racial disturbances in English
cities in 2001, though it echoed an earlier concern about cohesion linked to
underclass debates. The official report into these disturbances characterised
low cohesion areas as being essentially composed of non-interacting social
groups leading ‘parallel lives [that] often do not seem to touch at any point,
let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges’ (Home Office,
2001: 9).
Initial efforts to define the cohesive community in detail (LGA, 2002)
gave way to a simpler representation that ‘community cohesion is what must
happen . . . to enable different groups of people to get on well together’
(CLG, 2008: 4), a shift influenced by the changing preoccupations of the CC
agenda. CC as a policy construct therefore lays emphasis on the quality of
social interaction as the key to enhancing cohesion (Home Office, 2001). Home
Office guidance confirmed government acceptance of the importance of fostering
substantive civility: ‘community cohesion can only grow when society as a whole
recognises . . . the right to equality . . . [and] respects and appreciates the diverse
nature of our communities’ (Home Office, 2005: 3).
Taking the conclusion on parallel lives at face value (though there are robust
critiques of its evidential base, Simpson, 2004; Dorling and Rees, 2003) and a
policy desire to replace it with more integrated communities, government could
in principle formulate its response in a number of alternative ways in terms of the
nature of the role it adopts itself or gives to nominated agencies. First, government
could attempt to mediate between groups, addressing community tensions on
a bilateral basis but with no direct attempt to bring the groups together. A
second approach would involve government acting as a facilitator, playing the
role of honest broker in the search for forms of mutual engagement. A third
alternative would see government creating space (physical or metaphorical) for
groups to constructively explore and address problems for themselves, essentially
playing the role of supervisor. The final and least active alternative would see
government adopting a laissez-faire approach, expecting groups to figure things
out for themselves, acting only as an observer. These alternatives are summarised
in Figure 1. Our reading of the contact hypothesis suggests the most productive
option would be the second approach. To a lesser extent, an argument might also
be made for the third approach on this basis, but it would be hard to make any
kind of case for the other two.
Initial agency roles in the promotion of (racial) cohesion were articulated
as facilitating interaction, mediation and the protection of victimised minority
groups (Home Office, 2001). Central government subsequently established local
government (community planning) as the primary instrument for taking the lead
in addressing social cohesion more generally (based on duties imposed through
the Local Government Act 2000) and assigned itself a strategic role.3 In practice,
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Mediator 
Facilitator 
Supervisor 
Observer 
Group A Government Group B 
Group A Government Group B 
Group A 
Government 
Group B 
Group A 
Government 
Group B 
Figure 1. Types of Engagement
98 jon bannister and anthony o’sullivan
these arrangements have proved to be largely consistent with a ‘supervisory’ and
to a lesser extent ‘observer’ based interpretation of government responsibilities,
where this extends to providing meaningful spaces within which groups can
engage, but not to directing the precise nature of that engagement (Home Office,
2005; Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007; Broadwood and Sugden,
2009; CLG, 2008, 2009).
The Coalition Government has sought to redefine the framework for
promoting CC (CLG, 2012) in line with its Big Society agenda. Its intention
is that central government will act only exceptionally, with the aim being
to encourage and support others to specify, deliver and fund interventions.
Identifying the establishment of ‘common ground’, defined as shared aspirations
and values, as a key factor contributing to integration, a range of illustrative
initiatives is identified including the ‘Big Lunch’, a voluntary and private sector
initiative which aims to encourage neighbourly interaction through communal
eating. It is too early to judge the impact of initiatives such as this upon CC.
However, there is a clear resonance with New Labour’s approach. First, significant
emphasis is placed upon locally led action. Second, the proposals are consistent
with a ‘supervisory-’ and ‘observer-’ based interpretation of government
responsibilities.4
As to the role of evidence within the policy process (1997–2010), the
Citizenship Survey (terminated in 2011) was used to measure CC and by extension
the efficacy of policy (Home Office, 2003a). In particular, the overall degree of
CC was determined by the percentage of people who said they felt that their
local area was a place where people from different backgrounds could get on well
together. Although government is able to claim some success on this measure,
with the proportion of respondents agreeing with the statement increasing from
80 per cent in 2003 to 86 per cent in 2010–11 (CLG, 2010: 1), its meaning and
relevance are highly debatable, given the conceptual ambiguity of terms such as
‘local area’ and ‘background’ (Fuller, 2011).
With the official measure as the dependent variable, Laurence and Heath
(2008) used a multi-level modelling approach to identify individual- and
community-based predictors of CC. Unsurprisingly, deprivation was found to
be strongly associated with lack of CC. Once other factors had been accounted
for, ethnic diversity in an area was found in most cases to be a positive driver of
CC, which was taken as evidence of a social dynamic consistent with the contact
hypothesis (Laurence and Heath, 2008: 43–4). While the authors also found that
in-migration can decrease cohesion if large proportions of the in-migrants are
non-white and originate from outside the UK, they speculate that areas subject
to an influx of ethnic in-migrants may initially experience a decrease in CC that
ameliorates over time as interaction increases and residents acclimatise (Laurence
and Heath, 2008: 45). Lacking time-series data, the authors were unable to test
for this.
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Further analysis (using the same suspect dependent variable) confirmed a
strong, positive association between cohesion and affluence, with rurality and the
presence of community facilities also demonstrating positive correlation (DTZ,
2007). Negative correlation was found to exist between cohesion levels, the extent
of A8 immigration and the presence of local industrial decline, but no single
encompassing model of cohesion was found to apply equally across the regions
of England. DTZ (2007) acknowledged the approach taken throws no light on
underlying causal relationships and mechanisms. Its analysis therefore does not
support conclusions about what policies work at local and community levels.
However, policy has not appealed to rigorous research in this regard. Initial CC
policy positions were predominantly informed by interviews undertaken with
interested parties within the areas in which the racial disturbances took place
(Home Office, 2001). A subsequent practitioner’s toolkit drew on the experience
of a number of ‘pathfinders’, but in a way that has lacked analytical rigour
(Home Office, 2005). At the same time, the officially constituted ‘Community
Cohesion Panel’ expressed that it would be ‘impossible to develop responsible
public policies without much better data on community dynamics’ (CLG, 2004:
17).
The subsequent official Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2006–
7), charged with developing practical solutions to building cohesion at a local
level, drew heavily on ‘regional visits, round tables and stakeholder consultations’
(CLG, 2008: 6). The Commission was also informed by qualitative investigation
in a small number of case study areas (Ipsos-Mori, 2007). The Commission
duly found the ‘complexity and locally-specific nature of cohesion . . . raises real
questions about how policy should be developed and monitored . . .With few
best practice approaches, or evidence grounded project models to draw on . . .
local agencies could certainly benefit from further support and guidance from
the centre on strategic approaches’ (Ipsos-Mori, 2007: 13). While Orton (2009)
has subsequently used the contact hypothesis to interpret the experience of
community practitioners, he nevertheless concludes that the development
of improved interactions should remain understood as a long-term process
involving art rather than science (Orton, 2009: 63).
Finally, we should note that there has been no meaningful evaluation of
CC policy interventions. As Ratcliffe and Newman (2011: 2) point out, this
was surprising given New Labour’s enthusiasm for evidence-based policy. In
sum therefore, CC policy has been founded on the reasonable principle that
increasing civility is an essential precondition for improving CC. In promoting
CC, government (1997–2012) has come to interpret its role as largely ‘supervisory’
in nature. The work New Labour commissioned into the determinants of
cohesion may have thrown light on individual and community predictors of
areas with high or low levels of cohesion, but not on the underlying causal
processes, or the practical policy responses required to promote cohesion.
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Antisocial behaviour policy
Although the idea of CC in UK public policy developed from an initial
concern with race relations, it was understood to be an encompassing policy
concept involving a range of specific fields, including youth, equalities, policing,
regeneration and housing. Within this framework, ASB is seen as a factor that
contributes to poor social cohesion, because it can make people afraid to go out or
visit certain places, and because the public resentment caused by the experience
of ASB can lead some people to make scapegoats of social groups from which the
perpetrators of ASB are perceived to be drawn (Home Office, 2005: 33). Likewise,
the Scottish Government has articulated a range of specific ways in which reduced
ASB increases CC and vice versa (Scottish Government, 2009a). This belief on the
part of UK and Scottish Governments has been maintained in spite of the fact that
the relationship between ASB and CC remains poorly understood, with little in
the way of research evidence to illuminate matters (Commission on Integration
and Cohesion, 2007: 28).
ASB is formally defined by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 as acting ‘in
a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to
one or more persons not of the same household (as the perpetrator)’. Clearly,
this definition is open to broad interpretation (Harradine et al., 2004; Millie,
2008) and what one person interprets as harassment, alarm or distress may be of
little consequence to another. In practice therefore, the experience of ASB is as
much about expectations of the nature of social interaction and the qualities of
public spaces (Millie, 2008) as it is about actual victimisation (Von Hirsch and
Simester, 2006). In this instance, government has again argued ‘the need for a
cultural shift . . . that the rights we all enjoy are based in turn on the respect and
responsibilities we have to other people and to our community’ (Home Office,
2003b: 6). However, as applied to ASB policy, this sentiment was qualified by
the observation that ‘respect cannot be learned, purchased or acquired, it can
only be earned’ (Respect Task Force, 2006: 30). In other words, ASB policy under
New Labour demanded those deemed not to comply with social norms to act in
a respectable manner. For Somerville (2009: 149), this devalues and disrespects
all those who have not managed to ‘“earn” the respect of others’. The inherent
inequality that pervaded the ASB agenda led Millie (2009: 8) to conclude that ‘the
government has produced a dichotomised view of a respectful, law abiding “us”
and an anti-social, disrespectful “them”’. Put otherwise, in contrast to CC policy,
ASB policy has supported the institutionalised denial of equal status across groups
even though at least some of the behaviours exhibited by ‘antisocial offenders’
would be acceptable in other social and spatial contexts.
In practice, ASB policy addresses four broad types of behaviour (misuse
of public space, disregard for community/personal wellbeing, acts directed at
people and environmental damage) through four broad types of response;
individual focused, housing related, parenting related and geographically focused
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(Clarke et al., 2011). Within this framework, the emphasis on punishment and
rehabilitation has varied across time and space. In England and Wales, the
reach of antisocial behaviour orders (ASBOs) introduced through the Crime
and Disorder Act 1998 was broadened through the Antisocial Behaviour Act 2003.
By 2007, ASBOs had fallen into political disfavour with the Labour Government,
which chose instead to put increasing emphasis on early intervention measures
(Hodgkinson and Tilley, 2011). The election of a Coalition Government in 2010
marked a renewed appetite for enforcement measures, but with more ‘flexibility’
and ‘accountability’ (Home Office, 2011). Reflecting on the measures outlined
in this consultation document, which were closely mirrored in the subsequent
White Paper (Home Office, 2012), Hodgkinson and Tilley (2011: 295) discern that
despite some improvements in codification, it is possible to conclude that ‘that
this is largely an exercise in “rebranding” whereby similar results will be achieved
by very similar tools’.
The trajectory of policy in Scotland, where a newly devolved administration
accepted responsibility for dealing with ASB in 1999, has been different. The
1998 policy framework inherited from Westminster was strengthened through
publication of a national ASB strategy (Scottish Executive, 2003) and passage of
theCriminal Justice (Scotland)Act 2003 and theAntisocialBehaviour etc. (Scotland)
Act 2004. The framework was then revisited (Scottish Government, 2009a, 2009b,
2009c) at which point considerable emphasis was placed on a movement away
from sanctions against perpetrators in favour of prevention and this emphasis is
currently maintained.
Despite these differences in country-level policy trajectory and emphasis,
UK ASB policy has remained consistently founded on government sponsored
intervention to protect and defend aggrieved groups and to change the behaviour
patterns of perpetrator groups (mediated engagement in terms of Figure 1). While
policy makers have on occasion proposed an active role for aggrieved groups in
the management or dissipation of ASB activity (facilitated engagement in terms
of Figure 1), this has not been accepted as desirable by these groups themselves,
who prefer mediated arrangements to be maintained (Home Office, 2011; Scottish
Government, 2009a).
Crawford (2008) argues that, on balance, the symbolic and communicative
properties of the ASB framework (in England and Wales) and the endeavours
to convince the public that government was acting to address public anxieties
seriously were more salient than the appropriateness or effectiveness of the ASB
strategies themselves. The oversight of the framework, therefore, was restricted
to the collation of limited data on the use of powers and the ‘crude monitoring
of public perceptions’ (Crawford, 2008: 754) of ASB via the British Crime Survey
(England and Wales). Assessing these data, and in particular the perception
that the behaviours of young people are perceived as a problem, Tonry and
Bildsten (2009: 586) assert that ‘if the British Crime Survey results are seen as
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a proxy measure, the conclusion would have to be that antisocial behaviour
increased after 1998’. More generally, the spectrum of public perceptions about
the extent of ASB, as measured through the British Crime Survey and the Scottish
Crime and Justice Survey, improved between 1999 and 2010 (Chaplin et al.,
2011; Scottish Government, 2011) but the extent to which this reflects evidence-
based policy is a moot point. In England and Wales, some seven years after the
introduction of the ASB policy framework, most of the data used for planning and
monitoring ASB initiatives were not sufficiently disaggregated to support effective
targeting (Audit Commission, 2006: 16), there was no robust evidence of the cost
effectiveness of ASB interventions on an area basis (Audit Commission, 2006:
34), while comparable local areas were using different approaches and ‘there
has been no comparative evaluation of the success of these approaches (nor)
evaluation of the use and success of the different measures and powers, making it
difficult . . . to assess what works best’ (House of Commons Committee of Public
Accounts, 2007: 3).5 Clarke et al. (2011) conclude that ‘current ASB data collection
practice does not tend to generate the kinds of data-sets which can underpin
robust assessments of the effectiveness of ASB interventions’ (Clarke et al., 2011:
22).
The most recent reconfiguration of English ASB policy claims to be based on
evidence of ‘what works’, but does not supply explicit details about what this is
(Home Office, 2011: 9). The corresponding Scottish policy review is more diligent
in this regard, and drew on investigations into the use of ASBOs (DTZ and Heriot-
Watt University, 2007), the use of Dispersal Orders (Cavanagh, 2007), evaluations
of local authority neighbour noise nuisance services (Evans et al., 2007), the
implementation of neighbourhood strategies (Flint et al., 2007), community
warden schemes (Hayton et al., 2007) and intensive family support projects
(Pawson et al., 2009). In the round, these studies offer quantification of the use
of various policy instruments over time, together with limited attempts at initial
assessment of intervention efficacy and cost effectiveness (Scottish Government,
2009c). Practitioner evidence collected within and alongside these studies played
the decisive role in the above-noted Scottish policy shift, which de-emphasised
the role of enforcement in favour of a more holistic approach encompassing
additional prevention, intervention and rehabilitation measures. It is also notable
that the essentially coterminous ‘evidence-led’ reviews in England and Scotland
have resulted in considerable differences of policy emphasis.
Civility, interaction, the role of government and evidence
We have argued that a lack of CC and the occurrence of ASB reflects poor
intergroup relations and perceptions; on the other hand, that civility reflects
and maintains harmonious relations, though it needs to be underpinned by
acceptance of the legitimacy and equal status of others (Boyd, 2006; Somerville,
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2009). This offers a starting point for assessing the CC and ASB policy frameworks
in the UK.
CC policy identifies social interaction as the key to enhancing CC. In
terms of the situational conditions for reducing intergroup tensions discussed
in the second section, the importance of equality of status is well reflected in
the policy debate (Cantle, 2008) and institutional sanction is evident, but the
policy framework places insufficient emphasis on actively promoting intergroup
cooperation. Local government has been assigned the primarily passive role of
providing spaces within which people can engage (Commission on Integration
and Cohesion, 2007), but the policy framework is permissive and suggestive,
rather than definitive and prescriptive, and central government has been prepared
to offer only the most general and abstract advice (Home Office, 2005; Broadwood
and Sugden, 2009; CLG, 2009). Developments in the policy framework have been
informed by a modicum of evidence and there are legitimate question marks over
the comprehensiveness and robustness of this evidence. There has been limited
investigation of effective ways to promote CC, limited monitoring of change in
levels of CC and scant investigation of the effectiveness of policy (Orton, 2009).
ASB policy is also bereft of evidential underpinnings. There is little research
to inform debate, question marks (at least in England) over the effectiveness of
policy targeting and even doubts about the veracity of activity monitoring data
(Audit Commission, 2006; House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts,
2007; Clarke et al., 2011). Recent Scottish developments with respect to ASB policy
are more credibly based on research, but even here the latter has involved the
evaluation of short-term initiatives, buttressed by a heavy reliance on qualitative
practitioner views on ‘what works’ (Scottish Government, 2009c). Whether this
approach would satisfy higher standards of proof is extremely doubtful (Bond
et al., 2011).
More fundamentally, ASB policy is founded on a different understanding
of intergroup relations than CC policy. In particular, the policy framework does
not presume equality across social groups. Rather it is based on an inequality
of status arising from a judgement of behaviour. Designation of individuals as
perpetrators or victims of ASB implies some degree of ostracism of the former
for failing to comply with accepted social norms. But ASB is not about crime
per se, it is about perceptions of the social acceptability of various forms of
group activity and interaction (Squires, 2008). As such, a critical issue is what
makes certain behaviours unacceptable and why. This consideration is largely
absent from the ASB policy debate. The agenda here is not the promotion of
mutual respect in a diverse society but the earning of respect by those currently
outside a common value system, even if this system remains unspecified. ASB is
most commonly associated with the behaviours of youth. Bannister and Kearns
(forthcoming) demonstrate how current perceptions of youth are underpinned
by a growing intolerance resulting from economic and social trends that foment
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social disconnectedness, leading to the stereotyping of youth and their presence
in public space being read as a metaphor of social decay. By formalising and
legitimising this interpretation, in the process imposing a relation of inequality
between youth and other social groups, ASB policy acquired the capacity to
establish a vicious cycle of intolerance and to diminish civility.
Whereas CC policy favours either supervised or unsupported types of
engagement between social groups, ASB policy places greater emphasis on
mediated arrangements (Figure 1). More specifically, ASB policy has cast
government and its agencies in the roles of bulwark for the protection and defence
of aggrieved groups and to shepherd the errant back to the fold of mainstream
conformity. Those formally responsible for dealing with ASB generally see the
primary purpose of interventions as protection of victim groups (Clarke et al.,
2011: 21), even if this is attained through targeting perpetrators. While policy has
attempted to foster community roles in the overall management of ASB initiatives
in the belief that solutions will be led by ‘empowered individuals, parents and
communities who are prepared to stand up and challenge it’ (Home Office,
2011: 27), victim groups and the wider general public have remained reluctant to
get involved. The pertinent point is that the policy framework is not about the
promotion of equal intergroup cooperation or the nurturing of civility.
While policy makers have recognised that a link exists between CC and ASB,
in practice they have not explored the nature of that link to any great extent.
More generally the CC and ASB policy frameworks do not address the notion
of civility or the mechanisms for enhancing it. In consequence, the development
of the CC and ASB frameworks, involving (essentially) the same government
interests, display a distinct lack of articulation with one another.
Conclusions
Policy concern with levels of CC and ASB in the UK reflect problems arising
from the quality of relations between various social groups and involve a deficit
of formal and substantive civility. The policy frameworks developed within the
UK to address CC and ASB would, in an ideal world, recognise the relational
nature of the problems they seek to address and draw upon what is already known
to work effectively in the promotion of social harmony. Importantly, this would
include equality of status in intergroup contact, development of cooperation
in the pursuit of common goals and institutional support. CC policy, while
not exactly promoting meaningful and purposeful social interaction, does at
least recognise that the underlying issue is relational in nature and respects the
importance of equality of intergroup status in contact situations. These latter
attributes are conspicuous by their absence from the ASB policy framework,
which in many instances acts to legitimise intolerance and unequal group
status, particularly with respect to young people. More generally, the forms
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of group interaction promoted by ASB policy are largely indirect rather than
direct in nature, with government and state agencies acting (as mediators or
facilitators) on behalf of those perceiving ASB to rehabilitate or punish perceived
perpetrators. Attempts by government to increase the role of victims of ASB
in the management and implementation of local policy initiatives have been
misconceived to the extent that they reinforce the idea of unequal status across
social groups, and have in any case been met with indifference. While CC policy
promotes direct contact between groups, it seeks more to supervise such contact
than actively facilitate it, which may have been to the detriment of overall policy
impact.
Being largely contemporaneous, CC and ASB policies emerged and evolved
in an era marked by a new emphasis on the importance of evidence. Policies, in
consequence, are expected to demonstrate in a robust way both the nature of the
problems that they are designed to address and their efficacy once implemented.
Sadly, neither CC nor ASB policy can be held up as beacons in these regards.
In terms of scoping and reforming initial policy positions, the evidence base
in both instances predominantly made uncritical appeal to practitioner views
and the results from short-term evaluation initiatives. More fundamentally,
where research has been used to support ASB policy development and its
implementation this has been configured in a way that has reinforced rather
than questioned policy maker presumptions about the forms of engagement that
policy should promote.
It is possible that CC policy may have improved some dimensions of CC
while ASB policy has been pulling in an altogether different direction. CC policy
may have enhanced civility (though we find little evidence of this), but ASB
policy will have if anything (based on its formulation) decreased it and may
have contributed to a vicious cycle of intolerance. Recent European Quality
of Life Survey (EQLS) data (which covers all twenty-seven EU member states,
Norway and the candidate countries of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia and Turkey) suggest levels of racial and intergenerational tension
in the UK are close to the average for Europe as a whole. In 2007, some 40 per
cent of survey respondents in the UK perceived a lot of tension in racial and
ethnic relations, and 18 per cent a lot of tension in relations between young
and old persons (Rose and Newton, 2010: 42; Anderson et al., 2009: 57). The
policy ideal in this context would be the establishment of a virtuous cycle of
increasing civility through meaningful engagement between groups. CC policy
could be reconfigured to deliver this through a more purposive approach. ASB
policy would need more radical surgery, based on a reassessment of the way
it approaches the status of different social groups. Practical development of
both these recommendations would also benefit from a more robust evidence
base, built upon a richer appreciation of the foundations of civility. Finally, the
international recognition of intergroup conflict is suggestive of the potential that
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our policy recommendations may hold in other European polities. A key starting
point that this observation provokes, however, is the need for future research to
consider the conceptual drivers and evidential underpinnings of CC and ASB
policies within these jurisdictions.
Looking forward, we can begin to discern elements of continuity and
discontinuity between the New Labour agenda and that of the Coalition
Government’s Big Society as manifest in the frameworks (and evidential
underpinnings) for CC and ASB. Wells (2011) and Taylor (2011) have observed
that the Coalition’s emphasis on the promotion of civil society is closely related
to the ideas of social capital and communitarianism underpinning New Labour’s
public policies. That said, commentators have argued that the goals of increasing
localism and community empowerment are unlikely to be achieved when set in
relation to the austerity measures deployed and the broader ideological goals of
the Coalition of state retrenchment and increased marketisation (Taylor, 2011;
Sullivan, 2012).
The CC and ASB frameworks of the Coalition Government, despite
protestation of novelty, also resonate with those of the Labour Government.
In relation to CC, the emphasis on creating meaningful spaces for interaction in
the hope of establishing ‘common ground’, allied to an emphasis upon locally
led and funded action is consistent with a ‘supervisory-’ and ‘observer-’ based
interpretation of government responsibilities. In relation to ASB, there is a
continuation of emphasis on community engagement, community problem-
solving and community mobilisation (Hodgkinson and Tilley, 2011); thus it is
intended that the community are ‘able to make decisions and take the lead in
making change happen, with agencies available to assist’ (Home Office, 2011: 11).
Yet, matching Labour’s message that it was the state’s responsibility to intervene
in ASB, it appears that the Coalition intend to retain a role as ‘mediator’ and/or
‘facilitator’. In light of concerns as to whether the voluntary and business sectors
will be able or want to contribute to achieving the goals of these frameworks,
the government has launched Big Society Capital (Watt, 2012), which challenges
charities and social enterprises to ‘prove their business models and then replicate
them’ in order to create ‘a self-sustaining, independent market that’s going to help
build the Big Society’. Whether this new business model and fund will succeed
in delivering social harmony is uncertain as it has to be set against the extent of
recent public and third sector expenditure cuts (Curtis, 2010).
Notes
1 See also Somerville’s (2009) conception of ‘thick’ civility in this regard.
2 Social identity theory has largely concerned itself with why this might be the case – that is
to say the processes through which contact works (Kenworthy et al., 2005).
3 As the more general policy framework defining the relationship between central and local
government developed over the period 2000–2011, the channels through which cohesion
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policy initiatives operated also evolved – to include ‘local strategic partnerships’ and ‘local
area agreements’.
4 The CC framework is identified as being consistent with the ASB framework (Home Office,
2012) and the Localism Act 2011.
5 Rubin et al. (2006) assess the absence of evaluation of antisocial behaviour programmes to
be a Europe wide issue.
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